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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Davenport (1998) describes Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems
as “the most important development in the corporate use of Information
Technology (IT) in the 1990s”. A rapid development during the late 1990s
resulted in ERP-related consultations representing one-third to one-half of
the major consulting firms’ assignments (O’Leary, 2002). A few years back,
the ERP industry was predicted to be one of the fastest growing industries of
this decade (Adam and O’Doherty, 2000, ref in Shehab et al. 2004). How-
ever, the demise of the Dot.com era cooled off the market. Recent times
have seen the dawn of increasing demand for ERP system implementation
(Danielson, 2004). Meanwhile, Microsoft is spending billions of dollars to
fulfil their plans of becoming the dominant player in the ERP software mar-
ket (Friedman, 2004). This development is seemingly reigniting the industry,
something Hawking et al. (2004) describes as the coming of a second wave.
1.1.1 The changing context
According to Shehab et al. (2004), the past decade has seen a change in
corporate climate. The rapid development of IT has enabled easy access
to worldwide markets, an access previously reserved for large multinational
corporations. This has dramatically accelerated the trend of globalization,
thereby exposing even small- and medium-sized companies to global compe-
tition. To increase competitiveness under these conditions, it is crucial for
companies to adapt to the tide of time (Rao, 2000). New requests must be
met: demands of rationalizing organizational routines and business processes
to gain an improved level of efficiency in response to the macroeconomic ben-
efits of a low-cost nation; boosting transparency of both internal and exter-
nal functions to aid in strategic decision-making; and increasing availability
and just-in-time capabilities to be able to swiftly respond to market fluctu-
ations. The growing number of companies facing these challenges has led to
the boom of an industry of integrated information systems, more popularly
called ERP systems. They have been broadly defined as “enterprise-wide
packages that tightly integrate business functions into a single system with a
shared database” (Lee and Lee, 2000). Another definition is “comprehensive
software solutions that integrate organizational processes through shared in-
formation and data flows” (Shanks and Seddon, 2000, ref. in Newell et al.
2002).
1.2 System evolution
The roots of ERP systems can be traced back over 30 years when comput-
erized systems were first used for rationalizing business processes. During
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the 1970s, a system called Material Requirement Planning was used in the
manufacturing industry to optimize material flows and reduce working capi-
tal. In the 1980s, the system evolved into Manufacturing Resource Planning,
including essentially all internal functions of a corporation, with added func-
tionality for product costing, marketing, etc. This integration of functions
developed during the 1990s to form the present definition of ERP systems,
with the ambition to include all functions, internal as well as external, in an
integrated software solution. Most ERP systems of today are module-based
software packages, each supporting different activities. The modular constel-
lation makes the systems scalable and, to some extent, able to be customized
(Davenport, 1998). At present, different modules supply support for: sales,
distribution, material management, production planning, financial and cost
accounting, human resource management, and other information regarding
manufacturing, supply chain, and customer relations (Boykin, 2001, ref. in
Shehab et al., 2004; Chen, 2001; Yen et al., 2002, ref. in Shehab et al.,
2004).
1.2.1 Problem discussion
Today’s focus on core values, manifested by the trend of outsourcing inter-
nal functions, has led the old giant corporations to increasingly divide their
value chain into a network of companies. To uphold control, a form of ver-
tical integration is created by closely integrating the entire value chain into
business-to-business networks (Davenport, 2004). Using the same software
throughout the entire chain facilitates this integration. Therefore, partner-
ships will often be limited to those with the same ERP system, making it a
requirement rather than a business enhancer—a view considering an ERP
system being a price of entry for running businesses (Boykin, 2001, ref. in
Shehab et al., 2004). In this sense, it is possible to view ERP systems as
an institutional phenomenon. The question is not whether to buy an ERP
system, but rather which one to choose (Chen, 2001). When acting with
the institutionalized interpretation of sound behaviour, it should naturally
be rewarded by the investors (Cornelius, 2005). Research has also shown
that the financial market responds positively to the decision of acquiring an
ERP system (Hitt et al., 2002; Hayes et al., 2001).
The costs, both direct expenses and employed resources, of implementing
such technically advanced software as ERP are substantial. Additionally, it
is not uncommon for the projects to overrun both its time and cost budgets
(Fryer, 1999). These circumstances have made the implementation a risky
business, which may even lead to the bankruptcy of the company (Scott and
Vessey, 2000). Especially small- and medium-sized companies have found
that this project risk is overwhelming; they often do not have the same
robustness and buffer as larger companies have (Rao, 2000). The lifespan
of an ERP system is approximately 8 years, but the present development
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is to further extend this time (Scala Business Solutions, 2002). This means
that the acquisition process rarely occurs, especially with regards to most
companies that are going through the process for the first time.
As mentioned in Shanks and Seddon’s (2000) definition, ERP systems
are comprehensive products. They are often generic systems with their own
predetermined logic. The complexity of these systems is so great that the
implementing companies usually have to renew their organizational struc-
ture, culture and processes. However, imposing changes may not be in the
best interest of the business. The re-engineered process may result in a loss
of competitive advantages (Davenport, 1998). A result of the complexity in-
volved is that the expectations of the implementing companies are generally
not met by the new ERP system (Granlund and Malmi, 2002).
In conclusion, three main characteristics of an ERP system can be iso-
lated. Firstly, it is an institutional phenomenon, meaning that all companies
will strive for it. It is perceived as an absolute requirement for survival in
today’s harsh reality of global competition. Secondly, it is indeed a risky
investment; failure can lead to the demise of an entire corporation. Thirdly,
it is a complex matter—both the product itself and the implementation
process. The complexity, and the fact that it is seldom purchased, makes
it virtually inevitable to hire external competence in the implementation
process.
These factors combine to form a project that every company must un-
dertake; a project that crucially must be a success, and that this success is
largely dependent on an external source. These circumstances put the cus-
tomer in a strongly dependent position towards the vendor of the systems.
Naturally, such a position could be exploited by the vendor.
1.2.2 Current research
The paper by Shehab et al. (2004) presents an extensive overview of the
research in the field of ERP systems. Research has outlined the growth and
promises of these integrated systems, as well as the many difficulties and high
costs associated with the implementation (Stensrud, 2001, ref. in Shehab et
al., 2004; Al-Mashari and Zairi, 2000a, ref. in Shehab et al, 2004; Gardner et
al. 2002; Appleton, 1997, ref. in Shehab et al, 2004; Davenport, 1998; Adam
and O’Doherty, 2000, ref. in Shehab et al. 2004; Scheer and Habermann,
2000). There has been research aimed at the difficulty of evaluating the
results of the systems, as there are many aspects to consider (Markus et
al., 2000b, ref. in Shehab et al., 2004). Several models and analytical tools
for implementation and evaluation have been proposed, but they lack proper
validation since these models share the problem of being difficult to evaluate.
(Themistocleous et al. 2001, ref. in Shehab et al., 2004; Parr and Shanks,
2000, ref in. Shehab et al., 2004). The implementation phase has been
heavily engaged in the academic discourse. Many studies try to sort out
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important factors for a successful implementation, referred to as Critical
Success Factors (CSF) (Bancroft et al., 1998, ref. in Shehab et al., 2004;
Nah et al., 2001). There are many studies dealing with the complexity of the
systems and how to address this matter (Markus et al., 2000a, ref. in Shehab
et al., 2004). However, most studies cover the topics of implementation
and post-implementation. Shehab et al. (2004) regards the issue of the
acquisition process to be mostly left unexplored.
This can be considered to be a very interesting process in determining
how the relationship between customer and vendor will evolve. Partially
related, few studies deal with the vendor’s part in a successful implemen-
tation. Though some of the proposed CSF can be directly linked to the
interplay between vendor and customer, the issue is mostly seen customer-
related, leaving the vendor as a mere brick in the wall. While factors such
as training of employees, budgeting time and resources, and setting realistic
expectations clearly show a strong presence of interdependence; the focus
on internal aspects of the customer, e.g., communication and signalling, is
a clear sign of the bias towards the customer.
Neglecting the vendor side might obstruct a fuller view of the process.
It can be of interest to observe this process from a more general stance, thus
gaining a holistic perception of the problem of acquiring an ERP system.
This process is defined as the sales process, not only covering the process
from initial contact to the signing of the contract, but also the marketing
attempts to identify the customers. In the sales process, much is at stake,
contracts are written and relationships are established. The nature of this
interaction sets the arena for the future; giving the customer an opportunity
to rebalance the scale of power and decrease the dependency on the vendor’s
knowledge and performance.
Based on these arguments, it would be of academic interest to further
investigate the sales process and study the nature of this interaction.
1.3 Purpose
Describe and analyze the sales process of ERP systems, and discuss its
consequences for the parties involved.
1.4 Questions at issue
By observing the sales process, the interconnection between two parties is
studied, the vendor and the customer. Furthermore, the interconnection
can be characterized as the customer being dependent on the vendor, who
holds the key to knowledge and has the opportunity to take advantage of
this fact. In terms of information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour,
such an interconnection is well described by the agency theory.
The implications of the agency theory is well known, so is the risk of
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opportunistic behaviour. Broken down further, this is no other than the
basic concepts of trust and self interest. From the customer’s point of view,
these two concepts are of great importance; being led through the complex
process of an acquisition of an ERP system, the customer must trust the
vendor to be unselfish and acting in the former’s best interest. On the
other hand, the vendor should be keen on making the customer feel assured
about the investment, thereby increasing the chance of confirmed sales by
reducing the customer’s decision-making uncertainty, as well as developing
a good marketing tool by gaining a satisfied customer reference for future
sales (Gao et al., 2005). This lays foundation for the interesting predicament
of whether the vendor is willing to give up his/her advantage in information
superiority to please the customer.
Using a theoretical framework based on the agency theory, the vendor-
customer relationship will be analyzed. Moreover, its characteristics and
consequences aimed to be explored further will be illuminated. Using this
model, the intended purpose can be more precisely specified by three ques-
tions:
Using the agency theory, what possibilities of opportunism are involved in
the sales process?
What tools can be used to control opportunism in the sales process?
How can these tools be properly managed to reduce opportunism in the sales
process?
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2 Methodology
In this section, the concrete working process is presented in two parts: the
chosen approach and a methodological discussion. The former starts with
the research design being presented, followed by the data gathering back-
ground and the data gathering process. The methodological discussion starts
with the alternatives to the presented method; later, aspects such as replica-
bility, validity, and reliability are being considered.
2.1 The chosen approach
2.1.1 Research design
The background of this paper hints towards a context with a high level
of complexity; not only the intrinsic complexity of the actual systems, but
also social abstraction layers. Hence, when observing and evaluating such
a process, it is vital to detect subtle details and uniqueness of the col-
lected data. Furthermore, flexibility is also of great importance; during the
process of completing a paper, proposed problems and their understanding
can change. In general, open-mindedness is called for in order to conceive a
more nuanced understanding of the underlying chain of events. To effectively
fulfil the purpose of this paper, a case study design was chosen.
Bryman (1989) describes a case study as a research design with a strong
emphasis on context; seen from a higher level of abstraction, this allows
the reader to feel that they know what it is like to be in the organization
being studied. In addition, he also describes the case study design as being
useful for providing an understanding of areas of organizational functioning
that are not well documented. Ultimately, the reader will be provided with
a frame of reference to evaluate and interpret events. Also, according to
Jacobsen (2002), case studies are well suited for research design where theory
is supposed to be the output, not the input, of the greater study.
In this paper, the unit of analysis is defined as the sales process of ERP
system within the mid-size ERP market, defined as holding companies with
annual turnovers of 50 SEK million up to 10 SEK billion. Consequently,
no separation of corporate entities has been made; conclusions are drawn
on a mid-size ERP market base, and not on single companies. A delimita-
tion of the case study is that only the vendor side of the vendor-customer
relationship was studied.
Because of the somewhat vague circumstances of the case itself, an induc-
tive reasoning is preferred. Jacobsen (2002) isolates three important aspects
of inductive reasoning: little or no expectations, the acquisition of relevant
information, and the systematization of the amassed information. The latter
two point out important requirements for the handling of data, while the
first is more of a preparatory nature. Following such reasoning, data gath-
ering is put before theoretical analyses. N.B., no analysis should be made
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before the data gathering—the empirical findings should not be distorted
in any way. Consequently, the analytical process is therefore initiated after
acquiring a higher level of understanding of the proposed problem. Also, the
analytical process can be done with a suitable choice of theories, given that
the researcher has succeeded in getting better familiarized with the case.
2.1.2 Data gathering background
In a methodological approach, resources are scarce. Thus, choosing many
variables and a larger sample size will not be plausible. Naturally, one
has to choose between a large sample size with less variables, and vice versa.
When a phenomenon is to be described, there is a high propensity for a large
amount of variables being put forward, limiting this amount of variables will
seriously inhibit the analysis. This together with the exploratory nature of
this paper, choosing many variables and a smaller sample size is a natural
choice.
A qualitative research method forms the empirical base of the case study:
five interviews made with companies acting on the ERP market in Sweden.
Having less interviews, it would have been difficult to acquire a fuller per-
spective of the case; having more, issues regarding whom to value the most
had evolved, the case would have grown too large. As forementioned, the
chosen definition of the ERP market is of a broad nature. When choosing
the companies, breadth once again was chosen in favour of a narrow set of
companies. Hence, the chosen set differs in the number of employees, com-
pany size, existing in-house production, etc. The common denominator is
that they all sell ERP systems, and that they all are focusing on the mid-size
market. More specifically, this company function, i.e., sales and marketing,
is generally viewed as the pronounced key to success within the chosen set
of companies.
After choosing the set of companies, data has to be collected. Naturally,
the stated purpose of this paper is of an exploratory nature. When trying
to understand and describe a phenomenon, interviews are both intuitive
and effective. By collecting data via interviews, another methodological
stance is taken, closeness to the corporate subject. This closeness is crucial
when achieving a high level of detail. Regarding the individual character
of an interview, the general aim of the interview was to capture the greater
situation, not to obtain the interviewee’s personal opinion. Although the
interview approach is not a perfect holistic approach, its high degree of
feasibility and efficiency has made it a natural choice for this paper. In
order to complement the interviews, secondary data sources such as Annual
Reports were used to a smaller extent.
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2.1.3 Data gathering process
Before interviewing any ERP vendor, an orientation interview with a ERP
system developer, referred to as Omega, was held. The purpose of this
interview was to get a basic overview of the ERP market from a party that
holds no direct selling company function. When the companies had been
chosen, the respective corporate entities were contacted. They were briefed
of the overall purpose of the paper, and were asked if they were interested
in participating in the interviews. All of the contacted companies responded
positively. One interview was made per chosen company. Generally, the
interviewee was a senior salesperson, and the location was at the office of the
given company. The interviews were of an open semi-structured character.
Bryman (1989) considers an open interview as being relatively simple to
conduct, yet fulfilling its purpose—to understand a complex situation. Such
traits make the open interview an attractive mode of gathering data. The
interviewees were neither told in great detail of the theme of the interview,
nor given any questions in advance, thus minimizing the influence of the
theme itself on his/her interview responses. The questions were by majority
of an open nature, following a pre-set order. The individual durations were
up to two hours long. None of the interviews were recorded; simple pen and
paper were always used to make the interviewee feel comfortable with the
situation. To ensure the integrity of all interviewees, they were granted full
anonymity. After the interviews, each person interviewing wrote down his
notes in a transparent manner. No editing or reviewing between different
interviewers was made in this stage; this to ensure that details and differences
were not discarded before the analysis was made.
2.2 Methodological discussion
2.2.1 Alternatives
According to Jacobsen (2002), assuming a deductive reasoning, a researcher
has beforehand built some theoretical foundation conceiving the base from
which the empirical findings are evaluated. In other words, deductive reason-
ing has strong hypothetical features; a hypothesis, the theoretical foundation
with its assumptions, is tested against the empirical findings, the reality. Ul-
timately, this implies a closed reasoning, not very favourable when trying to
keep an open mind when studying phenomenological behaviour. This said,
Jacobsen (2002) argues that a researcher will always subconsciously delimit
and quantify any studied phenomenon in advance. Arguably, in this case,
with its pronounced focus on open interviews, such behaviour will have little
or no effect on the outcome.
With a quantitative research method, once again, one lands in a hy-
pothetical context; in some way or another, a questionnaire needs to be
produced. This fit poorly to the scope of this paper where ability to up-
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hold flexibility is an important matter, together with the ability to discern
the unique perspective of each respondent. Simply put, a phenomenologi-
cal stance cannot easily be quantified and standardized to fit into a generic
questionnaire approach. Jacobsen (2002) states an advantage of quantita-
tive research; to some extent a smaller sample can be used to generalize the
larger population. However, in this paper, the aim is to generalize within
the case itself and not beyond.
2.2.2 Replicability
An issue regarding a qualitative research method is the replicability of the
findings. The qualitative approach is commonly used to draw conclusions
regarding some underlying phenomenon. Here, Jacobsen (2002) sees an
uncertainty, shifting the qualitative searchlight can result in different output
from the units of analysis. Oftentimes, the phenomenon itself might be of
a constant nature but opinions and knowledge of it may change over time.
Ultimately, differentiated output from the units of analysis might lead to
other conclusions being drawn.
In the greater population from which the set of companies were chosen,
sales and marketing are important corporate functions. All the vendors are
well aware of the greater notion of trust, and more importantly, they are
constantly trying to improve. Hence, the larger phenomenological context
is known and addressed by the companies. Had a similar setup been used
again, it is highly probable that the same answers would have been given.
Of course, the actual data might be interpreted differently and thus leading
to different conclusions. Nevertheless, the replicability of these findings is
judged to be strong.
2.2.3 Validity
Another important issue of the chosen methodology is the validity, internally
as well as externally. Bryman (1989) states that internal validity means
correctness of the results, and that external validity means that the findings
can be generalized.
According to Jacobsen (2002), the first part of this issue deals with,
not only if the right persons within the set of companies have been chosen,
but also if these persons have given a representative picture. Regarding
the delimitation of only studying the vendor side of the vendor-customer
relationship, given the scarcity of methodological resources, there are three
motivational factors. Firstly, because of the aforementioned asymmetry of
information, it is more probable to find information on the vendor side. Sec-
ondly, while it is relatively easy to find an interviewee on the vendor side, it
can be more difficult to find a good representative on the customer side; e.g.,
a high internal turnover of managerial tasks will make it difficult as people
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who have experience of selling ERP systems might have moved on to other
tasks on the corporate ladder. Thirdly, since the ubiquitous symbolism of
ERP systems in contemporary corporations, knowledge regarding the acqui-
sition process might be considered to be sensitive information. By choosing
senior salespersons as interviewees, the difference in experience between the
chosen companies is minimized but not eliminated. Studying a course of
events and letting people describe it can result in certain important parts
being left out, mainly because interviewees does not reflect these parts. Fur-
thermore, choosing similar interviewees at the different companies imposes
another problem, working in an industry for a long time may lead to blind-
ness, one loses the ability to see the subtle details. Moreover, salespersons
might also show a convincing and sales-focused character; conceiving a clear
and transparent opinion might be problematic. As an attempt to validate
the empirical data, a first draft of the paper will be sent to the interviewees
for corroboration.
Regarding the second part, the external validity, the purpose of this
paper is not to make sweeping statements about a general ERP industry.
In the large-size ERP market, the vendors’ scope is of an overly complex
nature involving a plethora of parties. On the other hand, in the small-
size ERP market, the vendors’ scope is too small and simplistic to be a
good subject of study. Choosing companies broadly within the mid-size
ERP market, secures good coverage of the segment, and therefore a higher
level of validity is reached within the selected segment. However, due to
the nature of the case itself, internal validity is prioritized above external
validity; the case study is well suited.
2.2.4 Reliability
Reliability of data is crucial for all methods. As Jacobsen (2002) states, the
interviewer influences the interviewee by the way the questions are formu-
lated but also by the interviewer’s appearance. It is impossible to completely
eliminate this effect. However, it can be reduced dramatically by making
the interviewees feel comfortable with the interview situation. The chosen
locations of the interviews and the method of taking notes were two large
factors ensuring the interviewees feel comfortable. Moreover, the method of
taking notes and the way the collected data was handled minimized the risk
of loss or corruption of data. Considering the inductive approach, the inter-
views were held within a narrow time frame, i.e., a quicker data collection.
According to Jacobsen (2002), this is preferable when empirical data form
the core of the work.
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3 Empirical Data
This section presents the data obtained from the interviews with the ven-
dors. It starts with a brief introduction of the interviewed vendors, then
proceeds with their views on the ERP market. The data is presented by the
following categories: the sales process, contractual issues, and relationship
management.
3.1 Presenting the data
In order to present the sales process as broadly as possible, the empirical
findings are presented by subject and not by company. The aim of the inter-
views was to get a general sense of how business is conducted; this purpose
will not be aided by focusing too narrowly on company-specific details, such
a procedure could drown important empirical data in research noise. Also,
a less company-specific presentation will help to avoid disrobing the com-
panies’ veil of anonymity and protect their integrity. General statements
without direct references to specific companies are views of all five com-
panies. Any perceived subjectivity is a mere reflection of the views and
opinions of the company representatives.
3.2 Company introduction
3.2.1 Company Alpha
Alpha is a vendor of solutions for information technology and consulting ser-
vices. The company group, located in Sweden and Denmark, has a turnover
between 500 SEK million and 1 SEK billion. Most of its revenues is earned
through consulting services. Three different ERP systems are implemented
by Alpha. One of them is an in-house product, while the other two are
sold on behalf of their partners. Alpha’s own product is targeted towards
medium-sized companies within the retail and wholesale commerce industry.
The systems provided by their partners are used as complementary prod-
ucts, mainly directed towards companies operating with manufacturing and
distribution activities.
3.2.2 Company Beta
Beta is a unlisted company with approximately 40 employees deployed at
five locations in Sweden. The company offers consulting services associated
with the implementation process of ERP systems. The assignments are ad-
vantageously solved using software from one of their two partners. However,
the customers often already have some sort of ERP system and Beta may
have to adapt to this software. By retailing their partner’s ERP systems,
they address companies with up to 200 employees.
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3.2.3 Company Gamma
Gamma is an international company, operating in over 40 countries. In
Sweden, the company is represented in several cities all across the country.
Its overall turnover is around 2 SEK billion to 3 SEK billion. Half of this
originates from consulting services and the other half is equally divided
between license and hardware revenues. Gamma expresses that the license
share of revenue is to be increased, due to the higher profit margin of licenses.
The service Gamma provides is the delivery of complete ERP solutions.
Their targets are mainly manufacturing and distribution companies from
the mid-size market.
3.2.4 Company Delta
Delta is an unlisted company with approximately 30 employees. Its business
is located at the three larger city areas in Sweden. The concept of Delta
is simplicity and they provide relatively inexpensive ERP solutions. Their
ERP systems consist of two brands, a simple one for smaller companies and
a more complex one for larger companies. These two systems enable Delta
to provide and implement ERP systems in companies of different sizes; from
the small firm to large companies with a turnover of 20 SEK billion.
3.2.5 Company Epsilon
Epsilon has a turnover of approximately 3 SEK billion, equally derived from
licenses and project consulting. Their product is internationally distributed,
even though Scandinavia is considered to be their core market. The company
describes itself as a provider of business solutions with a focus on selling
licenses. A typical customer of Epsilon is operating within manufacturing,
distributing or service industry and has a turnover between 500 SEK million
and 25 SEK billion.
3.3 The ERP market
According to Alpha, the Scandinavian ERP market is unique. This mar-
ket has a high density of vendors and many of the larger producers are
located in the area. Alpha considers these circumstances to cause the com-
petition among software producers increase, also confirmed by Beta. The
competition among consulting services has at the same time decreased. This
divergence is due to segmentation of the market both in regards to industry
activity and size of the customer.
All the interviewed vendors confirm that the market is segmented. Also,
Gamma points out that it is needed to specialize in some industry activi-
ties. However, according to Gamma, some vendors declare themselves to be
experts in all fields. Hence, some vendors even try to sell in areas where
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they do not have adequate competence. Gamma regards the ERP market
as matured, little or no growth rate at all is expected. Delta states that the
demand for consulting service is large, but the demand for software is lower.
This is unfavourable for software producers as the profit margin is higher in
licensing than in consulting. Another issue is centralization; vendors con-
centrating their operations within major cities, leading to less competition
in the rural areas.
However, Epsilon is of another opinion. They imply that the competition
is not getting any higher and sees an unchanged situation. Beta gives a fresh
perspective of competition as they state that although competition to receive
a contract with new customers is high, future sales to existing customers are
not difficult.
The interviewed vendors agree that customers nowadays are more aware
of what they need. According to Gamma, this has led to much more specific
business solutions. Then, according to all the interviewed vendors, an evolu-
tion of the ERP market can be observed; the product-based situation of past
times has in present day been replaced by a more complete scenario with
services, education, business process re-engineering, hardware, and software
all being parts of a modern ERP system. Also, the focus is shifted from the
product itself onto what the acquired business solution can deliver.
Gamma and Delta also agree that the customers are spending more re-
sources on information technology; resulting in more extensive and sophis-
ticated solutions. They further see that this is leading to even more distinct
industry segmentation. Another kind of segmentation development is pre-
sented by Alpha. According to them, vendors selling their own ERP systems
will concentrate on their software, while others will focus on consulting.
Alpha also denotes that new large competitors, SAP and Microsoft, will
try to seize the mid-size ERP market, an opinion shared by Gamma. Beta
agrees that more comprehensive systems will be implemented in even mid-
size companies. Furthermore, Beta believes that the future licenses will be
free with consultant fees as the only expense.
3.4 Sales process
The sales process is a company-specific procedure, part of core processes
that forms the company itself. For Gamma, this is thoroughly documented,
a regulated and standardized process registered as company property. The
others see it more as a natural way of doing business; a semi-standardized
process that has evolved through the years, partially customized for each
customer. Epsilon stresses the importance of intuitive skills while Beta sees
the key as being the chemistry between the respective representatives. Delta
points out that making a sale is not a science; though the process might be
standardized, a good salesperson must be able to adjust and add value to
the customer in order to truly maximize the end result.
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Standardized or not, to clinch the contract, all companies go through the
same basic steps: marketing, qualification and negotiation. The marketing
stage picks out companies that fit the vendor’s market focus and companies
that are good business passes through the qualification stage. The negoti-
ation stage is the period of proposals and counter-proposals that hopefully
will lead to a signed contract. These stages are being described below as dis-
crete steps whereas in reality the companies see it as a continuous transition
with the next stage overlapping the previous one.
3.4.1 Marketing
The marketing stage aims at locating sales objects and establishing com-
munication channels. In order to direct their efforts at a potential target,
companies first need to identify a possible customer. This involves scan-
ning the market and evaluating whether potential targets fulfil the desired
profile set by market strategy, thereby roughly sorting out the actual com-
panies of interest. When a target has been set, contact needs to be made.
This is mainly done by phone calls, during which more information is gath-
ered to better make sales arguments. Beta combines the phone call with
sending a standardized letter where they formally present their systems and
capabilities. The goal with the first contact is to establish an interest and
gather more information to further evaluate the profitability of continued
engagement. Delta considers the evaluation to be the most significant part
of the sales process, as it is of uttermost importance not to be entangled in
a relation with low profitability and small chance of successful implementa-
tion. These initial steps serve as a screening process for providing a realistic
number of likely sales opportunities. Gamma states that 50 percent of the
companies passing this initial phase should result in a confirmed sale.
3.4.2 Qualification
When initial contact has been made with an interested customer, the eval-
uation is intensified in a stage of mutual qualification. For the vendor, the
intention is to make sure it is possible to deliver an acceptable solution.
This is done by frequent meetings, intended to identify key processes to see
openings for improvement. Gamma and Delta make an organizational map,
to clarify organizational power structure and identify key personnel. This
will aid in deciding where to direct the relationship building attempts. Delta
says it is important to discover conflicting wills amongst key personnel and
departments early, as this may be an surmountable obstacle on the route to
a fruitful relationship.
The customer’s major criterion would be whether the vendor is able to
deliver the desired value adding system. The customer’s wants are generally
not of a technical nature; usually, a somewhat clear problem is proposed,
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calling for a wide range of services and resources to solve the issue. Ac-
cording to Epsilon, the customer is only interested in receiving a functional
system—information regarding technological abstraction layers are consid-
ered irrelevant. The vendor then performs demonstrations of their system’s
capabilities. These demonstrations may alter the customer’s expectations,
expectations that have to be matched by the reality the system can provide.
Beta describes it as a interchanging process of demonstrations and specifi-
cations. Gamma states that the qualification should end with a preliminary
go/no-go, leading the relationship into a negotiating phase.
3.4.3 Negotiations
As the parties draw closer to a contractual agreement, the vendor’s inves-
tigation deepens. In parallel with the investigation, specifications for the
final solution are being discussed. As more and more information is being
unveiled before the consulting firm, specifications and expectations have to
be open for negotiation. Delta considers this repeating matchmaking to be
one of the most difficult things in the sale process. When both parties are
satisfied with a proposal, a contract tying them legally is signed.
3.4.4 Variations
The pattern described represents the most commonly occurring sales process:
the vendor identifying an opportunity for a new sale. However, it does not
necessarily need to be the vendor initiating the contact. In the case of Delta,
sales are almost exclusively initiated by the customer. This also applies in
a lesser degree to Epsilon. For the others, it is of a more seldom occurring
nature, but still present.
The marketing stage will appear altered with a different initiator. Di-
rect marketing efforts are replaced by indirect marketing, the most impor-
tant factor being mouth-to-mouth marketing by previous customers. Delta
stands out by performing almost no direct marketing at all. The company
always adds extra consultation hours to perform beyond expectations and
gain satisfied customers, resulting in 60 percent of their new customers be-
ing referred by existing customers. The rest are sought by indirect methods
such as exhibitions, advertisings, and an enticing corporate website. In the
case of Gamma, they aim to have two-thirds of their customers acting as
references. Alpha uses relations with other consultants to recommend them
to their customers. Beta states they are often recommended by the system
developers, as customers often feel more confident when using this channel
of communication.
When the customer actively searches for vendors, they often have several
alternatives. Delta and Epsilon assume a handful of companies are being
approached by the same customer. With many offers at the table, the vendor
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needs to put more effort in to win the deal. According to Delta, the company
that is able to gain the most information about the customer will get the
contract. Delta says this is not an ideal situation; they want the sales process
to be vendor-controlled. More resources spent in the uncertain early stages
will increase the project risk for the vendors in the race.
From the ERP vendor’s point of view, there are two distinctive types of
sales to be made: sales to new customers and future sales to existing cus-
tomers. The basic steps of sales for both types show a general similarity, the
difference lies in the effort needed from the parties involved. The initial stage
of evaluation and contact is simplified as there already is a point of reference
and an established channel of communication. Furthermore, the process of
gathering information and qualifying each other is greatly reduced, as the
parties have good knowledge of each other since their previous engagement.
Mostly, sales to existing customers involve implementing a new module or
upgrading an old one, a matter decisively less complicated and less compre-
hensive than implementing a new system from scratch. This makes selling
to existing customer less costly. However, as stated by Gamma, gaining new
customers is essential. If not for business growth but for the sake of sur-
vival, as it is virtually impossible to retain all old customer relations. Alpha,
Gamma, Delta and Epsilon, all producing their own ERP systems, consider
new customers as more attractive due to the aforementioned higher profit
margins from licensing.
3.5 Contractual issues
When the companies have agreed to doing business with each other, a con-
tract is signed. In the contract, the parties have ratified their intentions in
a legally binding agreement. This is to assure the functionality of the prod-
uct. Depending on what the product consists of, all the various parts such
as software or hardware are specified. All the interviewed vendors state that
the contract reflects how they should act and focus on their commitment in
the implementation process rather than on the perceived outcome. On the
subject of measuring this perceived outcome, Alpha states that it is purely
evaluated on financial terms; though the other interviewed vendors were not
as explicit, all vendors but Gamma did not show any different approaches.
Gamma had a more complete approach, using soft as well as hard evaluation
parameters. Epsilon sometimes adds performance incentives as a negotiable
option in order to receive an optimum balance of customer attraction and
own satisfaction. Both Gamma and Delta state that an agreement based on
performance would be an interesting option, even though neither of them
utilizes it. Delta continues saying that larger customers are probably more
willing to try such an agreement than smaller ones. According to Beta and
Epsilon, the contract is a rather thin document, a mere formality where only
the most highly prioritized issues are addressed. In addition to this contract,
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a general framework for the agreement is presented.
The total cost for the customer consists of three parts: a software license,
hardware and the consultation services. The first two parts have relatively
fixed and well anticipated costs, while the consultation costs are more un-
predictable. Common for the interviewed vendors, they debit the amount
of hours spent on the project. The price per consulting hour is specified in
the contract. These vendors also specified a maximum limit of acceptable
amount of hour spent. Beside this limit, Alpha has a minimum limit un-
derwritten as well. Alpha applies the method of adjusting price debit per
hour depending on how many hours are spent in relation to the set limits.
If more hours were needed than the limit allowed, a lower price per hour is
debited. If less hours were required than the lower limit, a higher price per
hour is debited.
Gamma does not think that such a time-based incentive works well, as
this leads to several bargaining opportunities for the customer. To avoid
bargaining, Gamma’s approach is not to sell the consulting hours directly
as a number of hours. Instead, they apply a method to sell as much of their
services as possible to a fixed price, such as system training. Beta states
that the higher limit of consulting hours is actually seen more as a lower
limit and to debit fewer hours than this would be a loss.
Another kind of time-based incentive is applied by Epsilon. They may
have a clause in the contract stating that a bonus is to be received if the
project is finished before a specific time. The contract also includes other
parameters. Alpha exemplifies that they offer support arrangement. The
conditions in the contract are regularly established under penalty of a fine,
if no other negotiated solutions are met.
3.6 Relationship management
The sales process is not perceived as a discrete interval of time, but as a
continuous process expanding beyond the signing of the contract. With a
new sale being confirmed, a target is set on future sales to the same customer.
Marketing for these future sales are done by caretaking of relationships. It
is also important to keep good relations as a safe and satisfied customer
becomes a good reference in indirect marketing for new sales. All interviewed
vendors hold managing the vendor-customer relationship as a important
factor leading to profitable interaction; without it, it would be difficult to
successfully implement any of their products. Alpha says customers buy with
their hearts and not with their minds, and states that a good relationship
is more important than just providing the best product.
In the case of Gamma, relationship management is part of their business
concept and it is a systemized process. The customers are partitioned into
different categories, each with documented instructions on how to be man-
aged; the relationship itself is said to be closely linked with ongoing business
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aspects, acting as centrepiece for decision-making. Gamma stresses the fact
that each relationship will evolve differently and for each customer a unique
marketing plan is developed, to be used internally. Attempts are made to
quantify the relationship but it is difficult and rarely used. Epsilon also have
structured documentation on how to build relationships, but says they are
seldom applied as it is a more intuitive skill. Interestingly, Epsilon stresses
the importance of the relationship as a springboard to make their customers
aware of business aspects unknown to them, shifting focus from the actual
products themselves on to a more general business approach, often leading
to business process re-engineering.
To build and maintain the relationship, Gamma has regular meetings
with the board of directors of the purchasing company. They try to keep
informal contact with key personnel, identified by their organizational map.
This map has to be updated regularly as new employees join the company,
contact with these may have to be established. The goal is to firmly obtain
and retain a customer, which is why all contacts within the purchasing
company need to be maintained regularly.
Another factor to bear in mind is to decide who should represent the ven-
dor. Initially, when the relationship is new, it is usually a salesperson who
maintains the contact with the customer. As the relationship progresses,
more consultants get involved. However, Alpha uses the same person for
both sales and implementation. Alpha uses multiple connections to mir-
ror customer organization, e.g., connecting an business consultant with the
head of the finance department. By this procedure, people with the best
knowledge of the business aspects of the company are targeted; long term
relationships are also preferred, corporate positions with high turnover is
generally not targeted. Alpha states that key persons to locate in a com-
pany are the super users, people in lower levels having the best knowledge
of the current system and the best abilities to learn the new system. By
educating these, they in turn will be able to teach the rest of the staff and
act as a sort of local service centre.
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4 Theory
Here, the theoretical foundation of the paper is described. In the given order,
theoretical elements regarding the agency theory, opportunism, competition,
the principal-agent theory, and relationship marketing are put forward. To-
wards the end, an overall concept is presented where the theoretical elements
are combined to serve the paper with an analytical framework.
4.1 The agency theory
According to Eisenhardt (1989), the agency theory is defined as a relation-
ship where one party delegates a task to another party. It is essential for an
efficient relationship to share information and risk. Eisenhardt’s model has
three topics with sub-sets of assumptions: the human nature, the organiza-
tion, and information.
Three key assumptions about the human nature of the two parties are
made. Firstly, both parties act in self-interest in order to maximize their
respective wealth. Secondly, bounded rationality holds all information re-
garding the delegated task is too expensive to gather. Therefore, according
to Nygaard and Bengtsson (2002), the parties have to make decisions with-
out obtaining all relevant information. Lastly, the two parties are considered
being risk averse, if the risk for one party increases there will be a demand
for higher compensation by the other party.
The first assumption regarding the organization is a partial conflict of
goals. Jap and Anderson (2003) explain the reason for the existence of a
goal conflict with a simple example: often customers want more for less,
while the vendor offers less for more. In the corporate environment, when
two wealth-maximizing organizations in relationship, do not share the same
beliefs regarding the road to success, there is a goal conflict between them.
The second assumption is that the criterion for effectiveness is efficiency, i.e.,
a process is only evaluated for doing things right and not for doing the right
things. To gather information in order to profoundly evaluate the intrinsic
true effectiveness will be too costly. The last assumption is about asymme-
try; information not being uniformly allocated between the principal and
agent means that there is an information asymmetry between the two par-
ties. The asymmetry rises, not only because of the high cost of information
gathering, but also because one party does not want to share proprietary
information as well as information that can be used in negotiations to max-
imize wealth.
Regarding information, only one assumption is made; information can
be purchased, but as mentioned above, the cost can be very high. This is
rather self-evident, that if information can be shared, it can be, beyond all
reasonable doubt, bought as well.
From the issues above, two problems arise: an agency problem, and a
19
risk-sharing problem. The proposed goal conflict together with the high cost
of monitoring the other party defines the agency problem. The risk-sharing
problem arises because the two parties do not share the same beliefs in how
wealth is maximized, i.e., they have different attitudes towards risk.
The agency theory has developed into two different streams: positivist
and principal-agent theory. According to Berle and Means (1932), the posi-
tivist agency theory deals with the management relationship in public orga-
nizations and therefore that stream is excluded. The latter, principal-agent
theory, is the scope of a later section.
4.2 Opportunism
Williamson (1985), ref. in Gutie´rrez et al. (2004), defines opportunism as
“self-interest seeking with guile . . . [which] includes but is scarcely limited to
more blatant forms, such as lying, stealing and cheating . . . [opportunism]
involves subtle forms of deceit”. Originating from a contractual approach,
Gutie´rrez et.al. (2004) state that the risk of opportunism emerges when
humans with self-interest participate in a relationship with unevenly dis-
tributed information. The effects of opportunism are clear, one party has
more information than the other and can therefore exploit the other party’s
inferior position. Achrol and Gundlach (1999) argues that if opportunism is
not mitigated, it can easily ruin the foundation of a long-term relationship.
Hence, creating and maintaining structures in a relationship preventing op-
portunism, is crucial but undoubtedly a difficult task.
Hart (1983) states that the level of industry competition has a great
influence in neutralising opportunism. However, the competition is an ex-
ternal input to the level of opportunism and therefore can not be controlled
by the company. Moreover, Achrol and Gundlach (1999) propose that both
legal contracts and social safeguards can, and shall, be used to mitigate op-
portunism. The former deals in formalizing contracts; the latter deals in
building a relationship with the other party. Contrary to competition, both
legal contracts and social safeguards can be controlled by the company.
Hodgson (2004) argues that Williamson (1999), ref. in Hodgson (2004),
ascribes the elimination of the opportunism as a sensational improvement in
the level of trust and reliability. Hodgson (2004) also says that Williamson
(1999), ref. in Hodgson (2004), interprets that if opportunism were absent, a
market without any relative and absolute advantages would form. Further-
more, Williamson (2000), ref. in Hodgson (2004), states that opportunism is
the only reason why promises cannot be used to solve the problem with non-
contractibility issues in relationships. As a summary, Hodgson (2004) states
that there are more things than opportunism influencing a relationship and
even if opportunism were absent, there could still be conflict; there would
still be a use of hierarchical structures and contracts in order to regulate
and control the relationship.
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4.3 Competition
When more than one firm act on a market, the result is competition between
the participants. If more firms enter the same market segment, the compe-
tition increases, and the customers will have an increased freedom of choice.
According to Winter (1971), ref. in Hart (1983), competition can be seen as
a mechanism of natural selection, i.e., survival of the fittest. Moreover, Hart
(1983) shows that competition will eliminate the opportunity to one-sided
performance slack in a relationship; if discovered, the customer can simply
choose another vendor. Conversely, a lack of competition will allow a com-
pany that does not perform at its best to survive. Hence, if the natural
selection does not work properly, given the opportunity, one party can act
in self-interest and increase the risk of opportunism in a relationship.
Discussing market segmentation, Grant (2005) stipulates that a clear
definition of the relevant market has to be made. Companies acting within
the same relevant market are considered competitors. Hence, a high level of
market segmentation partitions the broader market into sub-segments where
there are fewer competitors and, accordingly, a lower degree of competition.
4.4 Principal-agent theory
In the research of the principal-agent theory, a general theory describing
the employer-employee, lawyer-client, buyer-supplier, or any other agency
relationship is proposed. The greater theory contains a set of assumptions
that are followed by logical deduction. When compared to its positivist
sibling, according to Eisenhardt (1989), the principal-agent theory has a
broader focus and is of a greater interest in general. Furthermore, while
the positivist stream identifies different contract alternatives, the principal-
agent theory indicates which one of these contract alternatives is the most
appropriate given various contextual parameters. The focus of the principal
agent theory is on formalizing the relationship between the principal and the
agent. This formalization can be done either by way of outcome-based or
behaviour-based contracts to optimize the relation. According to Nygaard
and Bengtsson (2002), an outcome-based contract shunts the risk to the
agent. Only if the measured result fulfils the goal stated in the contract, the
agent is compensated accordingly. On the other hand, if a behaviour-based
contract is chosen, because of the inability of the principal to monitor the
behaviour of the agent, the risk is balanced towards the principal.
The model describing the principal-agent scenario is simple. It assumes
an existing goal conflict between the principal and the agent; an outcome
that easily can be measured; and an agent who is more risk averse than
the principal. While the first two are straightforward, the third is not as
obvious. Tentatively, agents cannot diversify their employment and should
therefore be risk averse and principals, who are capable of diversification,
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should be risk neutral. In order to describe the model, Eisenhardt (1989)
proposes two cases. The first case is where the principal knows what the
agent has done. Given that the principal approves of this observed behav-
iour, the behaviour-based contract would be most efficient. Naturally, an
outcome-based contract would needlessly transfer risk to the agent who is
assumed to be more risk averse than the principal. For the second case,
where the behaviour is not easily observed, Eisenhardt suggests two options
for the principal: investing in an information system or contracting on the
outcome of the agent’s behaviour. When investing in an information sys-
tem such as budgeting systems, reporting systems, and additional layers of
management, these reveal the behaviour of the agent to the principal. Thus
the situation is similar to the first case with observable behaviour. In formal
terms,
Proposition 1: Information systems are positively related to behaviour-
based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts.
Contracting on the outcome of the agent’s behaviour will naturally align the
goal to that of the principal, but at the price of transferring more risk to
the agent. Furthermore, Eisenhardt (1989) says that the outcome might be
affected by exogenous variables such as economic climate, competitor’s ac-
tions, technology change, etc. Naturally, when outcome uncertainty is low,
the cost of shifting risk to the agent decreases and outcome-based contracts
becomes more appealing. On the other hand, with high outcome uncer-
tainty, outcome-based contracts are less attractive because of the high cost
of shifting risk to the agent. In formal terms,
Proposition 2: Outcome uncertainty is positively related to behaviour-
based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts.
Having made these two propositions, Eisenhardt (1989) shows the heart
of principal-agent theory—the trade-off between the cost of measuring be-
haviour, and the cost of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the
agent. However, the principal-agent model can be extended in numerous
ways; redefining the risk aversion for both the principal and agent; relaxing
the goal-conflict between the principal and agent; altering the programma-
bility of the agent’s behaviour; altering the measurability of the outcome;
extending the length of the agency relationship.
According to Harris and Raviv (1979), ref. in Eisenhardt (1989), as the
agent becomes less risk averse, it becomes more appealing to pass risk to the
agent by way of an outcome-based contract. Naturally, when the agent is
more risk averse, it is more costly to pass risk to the agent. In formal terms,
Proposition 3: The risk aversion of the agent is positively related to
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behaviour-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based con-
tracts.
Of course, the reasoning of Harris and Raviv (1979), ref. in Eisenhardt
(1989), can be applied to the case of the principal, only inverted. In formal
terms,
Proposition 4: The risk aversion of the principal is negatively related
to behaviour-based contracts and positively related to outcome-based con-
tracts.
Relaxing the assumption of goal conflict between the agent and principal
might also affect the balance of outcome-based contracts versus behaviour-
based contracts, according to Demski (1980), ref. in Eisenhardt (1989). A
smaller goal conflict will make the agent behave as the principal wishes, thus
increase the appeal of behaviour-based contracts. Consistently, the opposite
applies when the goal conflict intensifies. In formal terms,
Proposition 5: The goal conflict between principal and agent is negatively
related to behaviour-based contracts and positively related to outcome-based
contracts.
Eisenhardt (1989) defines programmability as the degree to which appropri-
ate behaviour by the agent can be specified in advance. Consequently, the
more programmable a task is, the easier it is to be observed and evaluated.
Hence, a behaviour-based contract will be a natural choice. Switching to a
non-programmable situation with a non-deterministic behaviour will obvi-
ously render the outcome-based contract more attractive. In formal terms,
Proposition 6: Task programmability is positively related to behaviour-
based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts.
With a strong kinship towards programmability, according to Eisenhardt
(1989), the measurability describes how easily the outcome can be sampled
and evaluated. According to the principal-agent model, the outcome should
be easy to evaluate. However, many different reasons can be found making
this measurement strenuous: tasks can simply take a long time to complete;
they can involve a complex structure of joint team efforts; the outcomes in
itself might be of a soft nature and not of a hard nature that can be readily
measured. Accordingly, such a situation, with a low level of measurability,
will make the outcome-based contract more attractive. In formal terms,
Proposition 7: Outcome measurability is negatively related to behaviour-
based contracts and positively related to outcome-based contracts.
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Finally, Lambert (1983), ref. in Eisenhardt (1989), brings forth the last
extension: prolonging the agency relationship. It is natural that a long re-
lationship might lead to the principal being an apt observer of the agent’s
behaviour. In the opposite situation, the short-term relationship, informa-
tion asymmetries are arguably higher, making the outcome-based contract
more attractive. In formal terms,
Proposition 8: The length of the agency relationship is positively related
to behaviour-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based con-
tracts.
4.5 Relationship marketing
In a contemporary context where the supplier-customer relationship is a
vital part of conducting business, Hougaard and Bjerre (2003) states a fun-
damental assumption:
the value of relationships > the values of exchanges. (1)
Indisputably, such a strong statement about the value incorporated within
a relationship strongly encourages researchers to establish a new paradigm
of marketing strategies. Hougaard and Bjerre (2003) defines the actual
supplier-customer relationship as: “a relationship is composed of the sum
of exchanges and contacts between supplier and customer over time via the
regulating mechanisms in work and the parties’ intentions for the future
based on mutual understanding”. It can clearly be seen that such a relation-
ship does not differentiate between the supplier and customer; each party’s
contribution to the relationship is equally weighted. Also, the mutuality
is obviously seen in a longer time frame, thus myopic demeanour is not
naturally included.
Hougaard and Bjerre (2003) then define relationship marketing as: “Com-
pany behaviour with the purpose of establishing, maintaining and developing
competitive and profitable customer relationships to the benefit of both par-
ties”. Serving under the initial assumption, it is obvious that relationship
marketing must be profitable for both parties. Not only that, relationship
marketing must be considered as the key to gain a competitive advantage.
Another important statement of Hougaard and Bjerre (2003) is that market-
ing management must consider three different objectives: the management
of the initiation of customer relationships; the maintenance and enhance-
ment of existing relationships; and the handling of relationship termination.
Thus, they clearly point out that relationship marketing is not of virgin
birth, it is a concept that needs to be carefully planned and executed.
24
4.5.1 Relationship marketing levels
Palmer (1996) argues that a large problem of relationship marketing is the
positioning of the concept; when relationship marketing really should be
about manifesting a strong dyadic engagement, it has been associated to be
a simple mean for the supplier to buy loyalty. Viewed as a short-term tactic,
relationship marketing may not by definition be seen as a measure to long-
term competitive advantage. To add nuance to the concept, Palmer (1996)
classifies relationship marketing into three broad categories: a tactical, a
strategical, and a philosophical level.
Serving as a tactical tool, relationship marketing is little more than a
sales promotion tool. Such loyalty schemes may often give rise to oppor-
tunistic behaviour. Ultimately, according to Barnes (1994), ref. in Palmer
(1996), such opportunism will not render any commitment to the supplier
from the customer side, rather to the incentive itself.
When relationship marketing is of a somewhat developed nature, it has
risen to a strategic level. There, Liljander and Strandvik (1995), ref. in
Palmer (1996), reason that a customer is tethered by the supplier through
legal, economic, technological, and time affiliations. Interestingly, Dick and
Basu (1994), ref. in Palmer (1996), comment that such strong bonds might
lead to customer detention instead of the intended retention. A company
that does not enjoy a deeply established mutual relationship with its cus-
tomers may have a problem in sustaining the relationship, given a change in
external factors. Barnes (1994), ref. in Palmer (1996), states that seen from
a distance, a seemingly stable relationship might actually be built on shaky
ground with inherent discrepancies in knowledge, power, and resources in-
stead of mutual trust and empathy.
Palmer (1996) believes that, in a higher state of consciousness, on a
philosophical level, relationship marketing addresses the very core of mar-
keting philosophy. Traditionally, marketing definitions focus on customer
needs where as relationship marketing shies away from products and their
life cycles to refocus on customer relationship life cycles. When marketing
is conceptualized as the integrated sum of customer orientation, competitor
orientation, and inter-functional co-ordination, Narver and Slater (1990),
ref. in Palmer (1996), point out the key features of a relationship marketing
philosophy: using all employees of an organization to profitably meet the
lifetime needs of targeted customers better than their competitors can.
Besides the three-level approach to relationship marketing, Palmer (1996)
also describes circumstances when relationship marketing would be unrealis-
tic. First of all, parties of an exchange may simply not be interested in a pro-
found relationship, e.g., a customer perceiving the aforementioned customer
detention, as opposed to the desired effect of customer retention, might ul-
timately lead to unwillingness to commit. Another straightforward case,
the customer does not want an asymmetric relationship where they become
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dependent on the supplier, deals with reciprocity. Naturally, in a situation
with the parties’ dependencies between one another being imbalanced, flex-
ibility in adapting to the changing dyad might suffer since actions may not
be reciprocated. Social structures lie as foundation to the next case: for-
malized buying processes may prevent a relationship based on social bonds.
In a situation entirely based on social structures, there is an obvious risk
of corruption. To suppress such behaviour, a formalization of the process is
introduced. However, if this formalization is exaggerated, social structures
will deteriorate, thus making it difficult for relationships to prosper. An-
other aspect of formalization, legislation, leads to the customers’ increasing
level of confidence reducing their need for an ongoing relationship. In many
markets, legislation has reduced the intrinsic risk of buying goods and ser-
vices from previously unknown markets. Thus, in such a market, entering
a close relationship to hedge against risk is somewhat unnecessary. Lastly,
relationship marketing might add costs, putting a firm in a cost disadvantage
in a price sensitive market. In such a reality, in a complex dyadic relation-
ship that is difficult to quantify in financial terms, there is a probability of
money being spent on processes that are not clearly contributing to a cost
advantage.
4.5.2 Key account management
The greater shift towards relationship marketing undoubtedly calls for a
shift in management styles as well. Abratt and Kelly (2002) regard Key Ac-
count Management as one of the more significant marketing trends dealing
with this new managerial context; it is a strategy used by sales organiza-
tions to serve high-potential, multi-location accounts with complex needs
requiring individual attention through a carefully established relationship.
Furthermore, a key account is a client or customer that is pivotal to con-
duct a successful business in the chosen market. Put concretely, Hougaard
and Bjerre (2003) isolate three distinct types of key account management:
contact, coordinator, and integrator.
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Source: Hougaard and Bjerre (2003)
Figure 1: A contact relationship
The contact type, see Figure 1, is commonly referred to as “one face to the
customer”. It is usually used in newly introduced key account management.
Hougaard and Bjerre (2003) points out several reasons for this; the similar-
ity to the traditional supplier/customer relationship, the focus on the actual
sale to the customer, and the limited need for change. Obviously, a point-
to-point relationship is very similar to the traditional supplier/customer re-
lationship since the person responsible of the relationship is also responsible
for the supplier’s sales to the customer. Also, the limited surface of contact
does not allow any deeper insights of the interaction, the focus is on the
sale only. However, the last point shows that a point-to-point relationship
does not imply great investments; it is a cheap and simple way of managing
the relationship, making it attractive for early stages of dyadic commitment.
Source: Hougaard and Bjerre (2003)
Figure 2: Passive and pro-active coordination
Hougaard and Bjerre (2003) sees the coordinator type, see Figure 2, as sub-
divided into two types: passive and pro-active coordination. In the former,
the supplier is not interested in adapting to the individual customer’s needs.
Oftentimes, this means that the person responsible for the customers has
less time per customer. Consequently, this leads to a situation where the
customer gradually has to initiate communication via other ways than the
key account manager channel, becoming the initiating party. Pro-active co-
ordination, is mainly characterized by three points: a definite break with the
traditional supplier/customer relationship; an acknowledged close dialogue
with the customer; and strong personal relationships between the various
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individuals in the two organizational entities. Of course, when the estab-
lished relationship centres on the customer as an entirety, the traditional
supplier/customer relationship is breached. Naturally, having a closer rela-
tionship to its customers, the supplier acknowledges a close dialogue as the
prime instrument to gain a necessary overview. Oftentimes, this overview is
supported by close personal relationships throughout all the organizational
exchanges.
Source: Hougaard and Bjerre (2003)
Figure 3: An integrator relationship
When the key account relation type is the integrator, see Figure 3, Hougaard
and Bjerre (2003) states that it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish
who is the supplier and the customer. In such a situation, collaboration is
imperative; the concept radically breaks with traditional supplier/customer
relationship. The actual exchanges here are juxtaposed with a business
aspect, oftentimes, leading to a focused effort on the greater business aspect.
Therefore, traditional selling processes can rarely co-exist with the integrator
model. As the name implies, all levels of the two different organizations
are involved in this integration. The bottom-line focus is to develop and
strengthen the supplier/customer relationship, customer profitability, and
also the customer’s profits.
Senqupta et al. (1997), ref. in Abratt and Kelly (2002), highlights
three crucial elements of great importance for the key account management
process. Firstly, the performance of the key account manager is inversely
proportional to the number of accounts under his/her responsibility. Log-
ically, the more accounts a key account manager has, the less amount of
hours will be spent on each account, decreasing the overall performance.
Secondly, the larger part of the compensation received by key account man-
agement is still being evaluated on a monetary basis. This failure to reward
the strategy-building role of the key account manager might be of a contra-
dictory nature; the greater focus on relationship management is to build a
competitive and profitable relationship on a long-term basis, not to insure
short-term wealth. Lastly, for the key account manager, it is vital to use
contemporary information technology in order to enhance their abilities, no
stone should be left unturned in the pursuit of top-notch performance.
28
4.6 The analytical framework
Figure 4: The analytical framework
The analytical framework used throughout the analytical stages of this paper
is shown in Figure 4. The framework itself centres on the problems addressed
by the agency theory. Three factors affect these problems: competition, the
contract, and the relation. The factor of competition is assumed to be
exogenous, it cannot be influenced by a single player on the market. The
latter two, the contract and the relation, are viewed as the two ways to
foremost minimize the agency problem. Last, but not least, the output of
the agency problem is assumed to be opportunism.
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5 Analysis
In this section, the empirical findings are analyzed with the proposed an-
alytical framework. The analysis is divided into the same four categories
as in the empirical data section: the sales process, competition, contrac-
tual issues, and relational issues. The section closes with a summary of the
possibilities of opportunism.
5.1 The sales process: an agency theory perspective
5.1.1 Human aspects
Having Eisenhardt’s (1989) three agency theory topics in mind, the sales
process can be described as follows. Regarding the three assumptions about
people, self-interest, bounded rationality, and risk aversion, bounded ra-
tionality is the strongest contender. The initial imbalance in knowledge
between the vendor and customer regarding the product and services being
bought is a large probability for self-interest. However, since the event of a
sale is a relatively structured process, this probability is lessened. Also, the
process itself leaves ample space for being tailored to customer needs and
demands; this will further reduce the likelihood of the agent acting out of
self-interest. N.B., the self-interest is not seen on an individual level; it is
the vendor who might act in self-interest—not individual employees.
Regarding the risk aversion, since the majority of companies push hard
for having a large proportion of their customer as reference customers, the
impact of market reputation is large. In the situation where an ERP system
fails, seen from a theoretical viewpoint, the customer stands to lose the
entire investment. From the market side, if other potential customers learn
about this failed investment, that might adversely affect future business
streams with the given vendor. Consequently, the vendor faces the risk of
deteriorating goodwill; hence, putting a large portion of future revenues at
peril. For the vendor, this implicates a risk averse behaviour, based on a
market risk. As a result, many of the interviewees saw the go/no-go decision
as very important. If a faulty go decision was made, their entire market
reputation was put at stake. Another clear sign in the empirical findings,
the absence of outcome-based contracts, shows that vendors are more risk
averse than the customer.
Seeing large flows of information in early stages of the sales process im-
plies a situation with bounded rationality. Having a complex sales process of
an ERP system will naturally lead to a bounded rationality; it is difficult to
fathom the entirety of the process to take the correct decisions. Large flows
of information could be interpreted as sign of the severity of this bounded
rationality; if the customer had had complete information, no information
would have been exchanged.
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5.1.2 Organizational aspects
On the subject of the organizational assumptions, Eisenhardt (1989) makes
three assumptions: a partial goal conflict, efficiency as measurement for ef-
fectiveness, and an information asymmetry. Beginning with the least strong,
a partial goal conflict, one can see two aspects of the issue. The first, on a
long-term basis, there is no explicit goal conflict. The vendor expects cus-
tomers to act as referrals to future clients. In addition, there are examples
of vendors trying to over perform, i.e., delivering more than clients ask for.
In the end, these two facts show a large possibility for an alignment of inter-
est. Hence, there will be little or no goal conflict on a long-term basis. The
second, seen on a short-term basis, the situation is different. Supportive of
what Jap and Anderson (2003) says, there is a clear and obvious risk of the
situation where the customers wants more for less, while the supplier offers
less for more. This short-term discrepancy stems from the complex nature
of the product itself; it is difficult to quantify in economic terms, and offer
a wide range of services. This leads to an opportunity for the vendor to
take advantage of the situation, therefore a short-term goal conflict arises.
Its duration is limited to the period where the actual price is negotiated;
correspondingly, its effect is not as widespread as it first seems. This said,
both aspects of goal conflict can co-exist—they are not mutually exclusive.
Interestingly, all interviewed vendors used financial measurements to
evaluate their sales process and product functionalities. Such a clear use
of efficiency as measure for effectiveness can have serious results when be-
ing used to evaluate the complex multifaceted nature of an ERP system.
The blunt character of financial measurements can lead to a situation where
several important facts are overlooked. Moreover, it is by nature very diffi-
cult to describe qualitative parts with quantitative measures. Nevertheless,
several of the interviewed vendors mentioned measures beyond the financial
genre. However, they had been abandoned since they regarded the problem
of formulating and evaluating them as too large.
The largest issue under the organizational topic is information asymme-
tries. As seen in the empirical findings, there are large information flows and
a pronounced desire to better know the customer. Seen from a higher level
of abstraction, the process can be described as follows. In the beginning of
the sales process, the vendor has a large pool of information regarding ERP
systems, and the customer has little or no information at all. In order to
make the customer ready for receiving the vendor’s information, the vendor
needs to learn about the business processes of the customer. This implies
that the agent has the greater initiative; the agent has information not only
about his own products but also about the customer’s reality. When this
foundation has been laid, the pool of information regarding ERP systems
is transferred to the customer, i.e., the ERP system is delivered. All in all,
this means that the initial information asymmetry is a large problem, being
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reduced with time.
5.1.3 Information aspect
The last topic, information being purchasable, needs some clarification.
Since the product is of a complex nature, in the sales process, it can be diffi-
cult to even isolate which information that needs to be bought to lessen the
agency problem. Not only that, it might also be difficult to price such infor-
mation; many different aspects might form the constituency of the required
information. Pricing will then be complicated and demand an extensive set
of resources. In the situation where the correct information can be targeted
and priced, another issue appears; information might be proprietary or of
sensitive nature, it might be used as negotiation power against the other
party.
5.1.4 Implications towards opportunism
As Eisenhardt (1989) says, the agency theory introduces two problems: an
agency problem and a risk-sharing problem.
Firstly, regarding the first aspect of the agency problem, the high moni-
toring cost, there are two issues: the complexity of the product itself and its
high degree of abstraction. As mentioned earlier, it is difficult and costly to
monitor the entirety of the product—software, hardware, and service issues.
The product’s high level of abstraction is implied by the customer’s dis-
crepancy between knowing what to get and how to get it; they will probably
know why and what they are buying, but seldom have any deeper knowledge
about the delivered solution. In the empirical findings, this shows by the
fact that customers only want to know how to operate their ERP system,
not necessarily to learn how to tailor and control intricate functionalities.
Secondly, as mentioned above, two aspects of a goal conflict can be seen,
one long-term and one short-term. The long-term aspect has little impact
while the short-term can have strong impact throughout the sales process.
The vendor can control his revenues by way of two parameters, price and
volume. The latter is of the greater importance: add-on features, consulting
hours, educational services can be used to increase the vendor’s revenue. Of
course, some are more fixed than others, but still there is a possibility for a
partial goal conflict.
Regarding the risk-sharing problem, as Eisenhardt (1989) points out, the
basis for the risk-sharing problem is the different attitudes towards risk be-
tween the customer and vendor. The vendor, having two different sources for
risk aversion, the balancing act involving the market risk, see section 5.1.1,
and the risk stemming from the inability of diversification, see section 4.4,
will become more risk averse than the customer. Naturally, this entails a
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situation where the customer and vendor might not agree on actions con-
cerning risk.
5.2 The competition
There are two clear trends in the empirical findings regarding the competi-
tion: the growing market segmentation, and low market growth rate.
The former shows itself as large companies such as Microsoft and SAP
are planning to enter the mid-size market. Obviously, these companies must
see potential profitability in the chosen mid-size segment. Therefore, the
competition is regarded as relatively weak. This deployment affects cur-
rent vendors, they are growing more willing to explore niche markets. The
chosen niches are selected by way of careful industrial analysis; tentatively,
according to Grant (2005), this will further decrease the competition. Also,
according to Winter (1971), ref. in Hart (1983), the competition can be seen
as a case of survival of the fittest, the companies which does not seem fit
enough will chose a more specialized narrow niche, further decreasing the
competition.
The latter of the two empirical findings also points in the same direction.
The low market growth forces the companies already active the market to
differentiate into other profitable segments. It can be assumed that when
companies search for a potential market segment to niche into, they consider
the competition already present in the proposed segment. Consequently,
one does not differentiate into a market segment where the competition is
considered to be high. Furthermore, the low market growth is a formidable
market entry barrier. Hence, a vendor who does not have large resources
at his/her disposal will not enter the mid-size market. The fact that large
corporations such as Microsoft and SAP were rumoured by the interviewed
vendors to be considering this move, also support this. All in all, the market
shows a moderate level of competition, fitting into the reasoning of Hart
(1983), this will lead to a increased possibility of opportunism.
5.3 The contract
5.3.1 Reviewing of the contract
Among the empirical findings, the balance is leaning towards behaviour-
based contracts. Although a few exceptions are present, the majority saw
outcome-based contracting as less feasible. According to Nygaard and Bengts-
son (2002), behaviour-based contracting will shift risk towards the principal.
As forementioned, this goes hand in hand with the agent’s risk aversion.
However, there is little or no progress over the years in the style of contract
writing. A majority of the interviewed vendors saw the contract as a mere
formality; using the contract as a mean to address risk-sharing problems
was not frequently seen. Logically, if behaviour-based contracts are used to
33
such an extent, it implies that the behaviour of the agent is easily observed,
and also approved by the principal. However, in this scenario, both the first
and second statement can be disapproved. The whole process is not easily
observed because of its great complexity and size; amongst others, due to
organizational slack and wasteful management, the behaviour can arguably
not always be approved. Also, it would be too costly to monitor and eval-
uate the agent’s behaviour on a continuous basis. Interestingly, as seen in
the empirical findings, there were rumours regarding a large producer of
ERP systems dropping license fees and instead focusing on consulting rev-
enues; arguably, that could be seen as progressive contract writing—showing
a shifting trend in the ERP market.
5.3.2 Predictions
Although the behaviour-based contract is the most common contract type,
there are reasons to believe that outcome-based contracts will grow more
common in the future. One vendor already uses such contracts; others saw
it as a future possibility. Also, since customers are growing more familiar
with ERP systems in general, it is likely that they will ask for different
contract types, relieving them of project risk.
When analyzing the situation with the propositions stated by Eisenhardt
(1989), four propositions clearly point in the same direction: outcome uncer-
tainty, programmability, measurability, and the length of the relationship.
Firstly, since the customer is relatively clear in asking for a concrete solu-
tion, the outcome uncertainty should be low. Secondly, the programmability
on the other hand, i.e., how this solution should come about, must be low.
Finding out exactly what has to be done to solve the stated problem is often
difficult and costly. Third, the measurability should be high; once again,
since the customer knows what he/she wants solved, it must be somewhat
measurable. Fourth and last, the time frame of the sales process of an ERP
system could be regarded as short. Of course, the life span of an ERP system
could be counted in years, but the most active part of the vendor-customer
relationship takes place within a much shorter time frame. Looking back at
the propositions, they all point towards the use of outcome-based contracts.
In this case, Eisenhardt’s (1989) other propositions regarding informa-
tion systems, the risk aversion of the agent, the risk aversion of the principal,
and possible goal conflicts, do not conclusively point towards the opposite,
behaviour-based contracts. Firstly, in present times, information systems are
being used whatever the contract type is. Secondly, the goal conflict, with
co-existing long- and short-term goal conflicts, is judged to be too disparate
to decide which type of contract to be used. Lastly, the two propositions
regarding risk aversion, support the use of behaviour-based contracts since
the vendor is more risk averse than the customer. However, both proposi-
tions are really two sides of the same coin; if one is set, the other will follow.
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Furthermore, since the four propositions that support outcome-based con-
tracts are so distinct and the nature of the parties’ risk behaviour is not as
stringent, the propositions regarding risk aversion was deemed less impor-
tant.
5.4 The relationship
5.4.1 Positioning of the relationship
All interviewed vendors regarded forming long-term relationships with their
customers as very important. From a technical viewpoint, the relationships
themselves are often formed by the vendor mirroring the customer’s organi-
zation. Also, they are, to a large extent, handled informally. Interestingly,
all interviewed vendors gave accounts of the superior position of knowing the
most about the customer, i.e., the one vendor with the most information will
get the contract. Therefore, an obvious dichotomy exist, on one hand, the
vendor wants a long-term relationship with strong touch of dyadic influences.
On the other hand, the vendor wants the relationship in order to get the
contract and nothing more. When compared to Palmer’s (1996) reasoning
about whether the sole purpose of relationships is to buy loyalty, obvious
similarities can be seen, one positive interpretation and one negative. In
this case, the relationship can be seen as a simple mean to buy loyalty; if
a vendor gathers more information than a competitor does, they will win
the deal, i.e., the customer’s loyalty. Also, buying loyalty is mostly done in
abstract terms; the vendor allocates resources in both time and money to
build this relationship in order to show the customer his great commitment
and drive.
5.4.2 The level of relationship
When analyzing the relationship between vendor and customer with Palmer’s
(1996) three levels, several facts stand out. First of all, the relationship is
clearly seen as a sales promotion tool. This is mainly justified by two em-
pirical findings: the social factor of selling ERP systems, and future sales to
the same customer. Firstly, all interviewed vendors mentioned large social
factors in the sales process, people buy with their hearts and not with their
minds. Secondly, having a relationship with a customer entails a strong
propensity of future sales. Although the notion of a relationship implies a
long-term duration, the relationships are shown to be most intense in their
initial stages rather than being equally distributed across the entire duration.
Therefore, if the relationship is judged on the amount of information being
passed through, their respective duration are on short-term basis. Also, the
relationship itself resembles a sales point, something that is needed in order
to show commitment to the customer and to secure the sale. As Hougaard
and Bjerre (2003) define relationship marketing, the concern is to establish,
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maintain, and develop competitive and profitable relationships between both
parties. Emphasizing the relationship as a sales point, and not the compet-
itiveness and profits thought to emanate from the relationship, shows that
the relationship might not be what it is intended to be.
Another aspect of the relationship is the vendor’s need to get familiarized
with the customer. As mentioned above, in order to secure the contract,
the vendor needs to gather as much information about the customer as
possible. Furthermore, when the contract has been secured, the vendor often
delves into a deep business process re-engineering of the customer’s business
processes. When seen as a relationship issue, this re-engineering could be
seen as a mean to boost the ties between the vendor and the customer.
Concurrently, the customer becomes more dependent on the products sold,
and thus, the vendor as well.
Among the interviewed vendors, some mentioned the aspect of a close
direct interaction regarding the customer’s business aspects—a clear sign for
a relationship on a philosophical level. Nevertheless, few accounts of how this
higher level should be established, maintained, and developed were given.
Hence, it is difficult to tell if this indeed is a relationship on a higher level.
When critically reviewed, two points become clear: the relationship as a sales
promotion tool, and the large degree of customer detention. Accordingly, a
relationship with such characteristics is on a tactical level, possibly reaching
strategic levels.
5.4.3 Key account management
With the tightly knit information flows in the sales process, it is obvious
that the modes of key account management are on a higher level. Often the
process involves large corporate entities; naturally, such scenarios demand
clear channels of communication. Three empirical findings stand out: the
vendor wanting to control, the vendor not adjusting to the customer, and
strong social bonds. The vendor will try to control the actual sales process;
a situation with the customer controlling negotiations, etc. was not seen
favourable. Also, the re-engineering process is shifted towards the customer,
the vendor wants to adjust as little as possible to uphold efficiency. Lastly,
strong informal means of communication were stressed, serving the vendor
with a wide range of modes of contact. These points fit well into the sec-
ond category of Hougaard and Bjerre (2003), the coordinator category. All
interviewed vendors gave the same impression of wanting to gain an initia-
tive and control over the sales process. This can be seen as a means to
gain an overview of the process, as described in the pro-active coordination.
Also, this urge for control will lead to many strong personal relationships
being initiated, also described as pro-active coordination. However, since
the vendor does not want to overtly adjust to the customer, but wants to
sell standardized products, this is a clear sign of passive behaviour. Also,
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with a strong emphasis on informal channels of communication, this further
strengthens support for the passive coordination.
With the alleged focus on the relationship, the structure of the key ac-
count management should be the integrator model. No clear sign of vendors
explicitly looking beyond the exchanges in favour of the business aspect of
the relationship itself was seen. Furthermore, no strong focus on customer
profitability and the customer’s profits could be seen. Also, there always
seemed to be a clear distinction between the vendor and the customer.
5.5 Possibilities of opportunism
5.5.1 Forerunners of opportunism
Because of aspects such as bounded rationality, information asymmetries,
goal conflicts, and risk aversion, there is clearly a strong possibility for prob-
lems as pointed out by the agency theory. These are the agency problem
and risk-sharing problem. As a part of the agency problem, the monitor-
ing problem can be difficult to tackle. Combining the monitoring problem
with the problem of risk-sharing can lead to an even stronger challenge.
According to Gutie´rrez et al. (2004), opportunism emerges when there is
unevenly distributed information. Arguably, both the agency problem and
the risk-sharing problem stem from unevenly distributed information. The
former is perhaps more intuitive, monitoring- and goal conflict problems are
problems of incorrectly distributed information. The latter can be seen as
unevenly distributed information where the customer is unaware of the ven-
dor’s risk aversion. Naturally, in such a situation, the customer might react
negatively to the vendor, demanding more compensation for every unit of
increased risk. Thus, seen from the customer’s viewpoint, opportunism has
struck.
5.5.2 The regulating factors
As seen in the analytical framework stated before, three factors affect the
complications emanating from the agency and risk-sharing problem: the
level of competition; legal safeguards, i.e., the contract; and social structures,
i.e., the relation. Clearly, the stakeholders can control the last two factors.
Both factors are powerful tools to control the given problems.
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6 Discussion and results
Here, the analysis will be discussed, answering the questions at issue. Since
the previous section, the disposition has changed; here, instead of basing
it on the proposed analytical framework, it shall be based on the topics
addressed by the questions at issue.
6.1 Opportunism
The analysis has shown a clear asymmetry of information between vendor
and customer, see section 5.1.1. The customer is in a state of strong de-
pendency on the vendor; he/she is forced to act with bounded rationality,
see section 5.1.2, and make decisions without sufficient knowledge of valid
conditions to realistically anticipate the outcome.
6.1.1 Risk
The agent not being able to diversify, and thereby increasing his/her risk
aversion relative to that of the the principal, is a general assumption of the
agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). In this paper, since an ERP system is
affecting the company as a whole and therefore making diversification of the
risk more difficult for the customer, this risk is considered of lesser impor-
tance. However, this does not relax the assumption of an agent being more
risk averse; because the outcome is not only a function of agent behaviour
but also of internal factors of the principal, the principal should be willing
to accept a higher risk (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Two concepts of risk have been found to be dominant in the case of ERP
systems: a project risk and a market risk. The project risk is seen within
an isolated ERP project. At stake is not only direct expenses in form of
invested capital and employed resources, but also indirect effects of risking
key business processes and the loss of strategic advantages. Naturally, this
risk is strongly connected with the customer.
The market risk is the endangerment of the vendor’s ability to attract
future customers. If the project fails in the eyes of the customer, the vendor
risks not only future sales opportunities to the customer but loss of market
goodwill.
6.1.2 Defining the reality
Increasing goodwill is dependent on the satisfaction of the customer; it is
vital for the vendor to ensure that the customer feels contented with his
purchase by being able to reap the benefits of a more effective organization.
However, this raises the question of how well the customer can observe the
effectiveness gained. As argued in the analysis, see section 5.1.2, results are
being measured in the form of productivity and efficiency, and overlook other
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important aspects. To be able to fully evaluate the intrinsic effectiveness
of the system, a customer must compare different alternatives. Since the
customer has little information of the reality of the systems, the vendor will
define this reality. Relevant comparisons are therefore limited to the reality
the vendor provides, and observed levels of efficiency within this narrow
environment will be assumed to be measures of true effectiveness. This
gives the vendor an opportunity to create a reality suited for his/her own
objectives. Hence, opportunistic behaviour could be involved in creating a
pseudo-reality, coloured by the vendor’s own agenda.
This potential opportunism is revealed in two forms: safeguarding and
fringe selling.
6.1.3 Safeguarding
The long term goal of a successful implementation is shared by both parties,
see section 5.1.2. The vendor’s goal is aligned with the customer because
of the market risk involved. Although they share this goal, the vendor
wants it regardless of costs for the customer, while the customer wants the
costs to be justified in cost-benefit terms. Because the vendor strives for
customer satisfaction, fabricating this justification will suffice. To secure a
successful implementation, the vendor will have incentive to overstate the
number of consulting hours needed, the extent of education required, etc.
He/she will have incentive to lower the customer’s expectations, giving room
for a perceived better performance. This will lower the bar to reach a result
the customer will feel contented with, and thus lowering the market risk for
the vendor. All of this involves the vendor tampering with the pseudo-reality,
thus safeguarding the customer’s satisfaction.
However, this is a narrow road to walk; while wanting to safeguard the
customer’s satisfaction, the vendor also needs to make sales arguments; a
matter which rhymes ill with lowering expectations and overstating costs. In
the end, the vendor must be able to show that the investment is worthwhile,
which will constrain the safeguarding within certain limits. Finding these
limits, the vendor will have to evaluate how much the customer is willing to
pay, a classic salesperson’s skill. Since ERP systems could be a pre-requisite
for staying in business with important partners, the alternative cost of not
implementing could lever the threshold of acceptable costs.
Introducing a bidding process, the vendor’s focus on making sales ar-
guments will override safeguarding. When several vendors are involved in
the process, the customer will get several realities defined and the maneu-
verable space for safeguarding will likely decrease. This will only occur to
some extent; since the proposals are based on sparse information as com-
pared to when the vendor had been chosen, there will be opportunities for
safeguarding during the upcoming negotiation phase.
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6.1.4 Fringe selling
In the short term, there is a goal conflict between vendor and customer, see
section 5.1.2. This is sprung from the basic business concept of profit; both
parties wish to maximize their profit. There are two ways for the vendor to
increase profits: price and volume. Price is a constant factor, since licenses
and cost per debited hour are relatively fixed. However, by increasing the
volume of sales, profit can be increased, regardless of benefiting the cus-
tomer. Thus, via this fringe selling, the vendor can increase their profit at
the expense of the customer, resulting in a goal conflict.
This can be exemplified as follows. The customer being guided through
the pseudo-reality could be persuaded to discover needs he/she did not know
existed. Since these needs are defined by the reality provided by the vendor,
they may have little relevance in the real world, making the customer end
up with more than he/she had bargained for.
Furthermore, if the contract is based on neither outcome nor expense,
the vendor will not be rewarded for giving these special attention. E.g.,
only if it is stated in the contract that expenses have a fixed maxima, there
is little motivation to remain below this point. Consider a situation when
a vendor feels they have successfully implemented the ERP system at a
lesser cost than predicted in the contract. Although not motivated in terms
of cost-benefit for the customer, the vendor will have incentive for further
increasing effort as it will yield a higher income. In fact, this will also be
ensuring the success, thus giving the vendor a double incentive.
At this point in the discussion, the first question at issue can be answered:
Using the agency theory, what possibilities of opportunism are involved in
the sales process?
The analysis has shown the potential of opportunistic behaviour. This is
manifested in the pseudo-reality the vendor provides for the customer, and
takes the form of safeguarding and fringe selling. Safeguarding is the act of
securing the customer’s perceived satisfaction in a value-destroying manner.
Fringe selling is the vendor’s use of increased sales volumes for higher profits
at the expense of the customer.
6.2 Controlling tools
As presented before, contracts and relationships can be seen as tools manag-
ing the possibility for opportunism. Seen from a higher level of abstraction,
they differ in their fundamental disposition; contracts are traditionally seen
as a hard financial formalization while relations contextually contribute with
flexibility and work as means of communication. They are presented in the
following sections.
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6.2.1 The contract
As pointed out in the analysis, contracts are most commonly behaviour-
based for the ERP vendors. Consequently, the principal is bearing a majority
of the risk. Partitioning the risk as such, an imbalance appears. Arguably,
both parties in the process of selling an ERP system should bear risk; a
party that adds uncertainty of outcome from a certain task should naturally
be held responsible of the observed result. Two factors speak in favour of
using outcome-based contracts: a theoretical analysis based on principal-
agent theory, and the empirical findings regarding the evolution of the ERP
market.
As seen in section 5.3.2, the analysis of the empirical data by way of
Eisenhardt’s (1989) propositions results in outcome-based contracts being
favoured. Contributing the most to the result, the customers have a clear
knowledge of what they want but neither have they got any resources nor
capabilities to fulfil this want. Knowing what they want, the observed result
can easily be compared to the original want; also, being precise about their
want, the observed result should not differ much from the original want. On
the opposing side, aspects such as goal conflict and risk aversion are not
conclusively pointing at behaviour-based contracts. Of course, as stated in
section 5.1.2, short-term goal conflict can be observed. But with a longer
time frame, as the intensity of the interaction wears off, these effects decline
in magnitude. Ultimately, since the long-term goal congruence co-exists
with the short-term goal conflicts, the proposition regarding goal conflict
will be inconclusive. Regarding risk aversion, with the reality provided by
the vendor mentioned above, the level of risk aversion of one party is not
always perfectly correlated with the resulted risk partitioning—with an ill-
defined reality, correlation will be weak. Hence, based on the propositions
regarding risk aversion, a clear-cut conclusion can not be drawn.
When the ERP market is seen from a historical view point, the empirical
findings show an apparent shift of character. In the infancy of the market,
customers focused on buying hardware per se; hence the product itself was
based on hardware and not on functionality. Obviously, from the vendor
side, the sales process was relatively simple. When formalizing such a sit-
uation, the simple structure of behaviour-based contracts was considered a
natural choice. As the market evolved, the basis was switched; when ERP
systems began addressing general business aspects, the product was based
on functionality and not on hardware. By addressing business aspects, the
simple structure of behaviour-based contracts could be regarded as obso-
lete. Securing the functionality of the targeted business aspects, a close
interaction between the vendor and the customer is important. With such
closeness, not only the customer but also the vendor should be directly de-
pendent on a favourable outcome. Therefore, regulating such an interaction
is best done with an outcome-based contract.
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Obviously, the use of outcome-based contracts will favourably rebalance
the observed risk between both parties. Also, the vendor will have strong in-
centives to act in the customer’s best interest. Unfortunately, outcome-based
contracts impose two new problems; how to find the essential information
to evaluate, and how to quantify that information. However, as time passes,
within the ERP market some form of standard practice will most probably
evolve. Thus, in present time, for a vendor acting as a first mover, adopt-
ing a more innovative style of contract writing might convey competitive
advantages.
6.2.2 The relationship
To sum up the analysis of the relationship, see section 5.4, three factors
stand out: the use of the relationship as a sales promotion tool; the aspect
of customer detention; and its relatively short time frame and intense nature.
With these factors in mind, the relationship does not resemble true relation-
ship marketing. Once again, as Palmer (1996) points out, true relationship
marketing should place the relationship and not the offered product as cen-
tre of attention—the direct aim is to increase the profit of the customer via
the relationship. Two factors are in favour of cultivating a relationship: a
theoretical analysis based on relationship marketing, and, once again, the
empirical findings regarding the evolution of the ERP market.
In the case studied in this paper, business process re-engineering forms
the inner core of the interaction between vendor and customer. The vendor
offers an ERP system, which needs careful implementation in order to fulfil
its specification; serving as a basis for the implementation, the business
processes of the customer often need to be re-engineered to fit into the new
context. Clearly, many relational aspects are involved as the interaction
has to be as lean as possible, yet delivering profitable results. Hence, in
the situation of a customer acquiring an ERP system, as section 1.4 points
out, trust is a large issue. Naturally, once the customer has chosen its
ERP system, they must trust the vendor, and thus, the need for a positive
relationship is born. At this level, the scenario fits very well into Hougaard
and Bjerre’s (2003) definition of relationship marketing, see section 4.5. A
relationship is formed, that is supposed to benefit both parties; also, there
is an obvious nurturing of the relationship itself.
Once again, the historical view on the ERP market also hints of the
benefits of relationship marketing. As mentioned above, there are two sit-
uations: basing the product on functionality or on hardware. In the first
case, there is no pronounced need in having a deeper relationship, the prod-
uct itself is relatively well defined and clear—the closeness to the customer
is not that great. In the second case, the need for a relationship is obvious.
Simply put, the vendor offering functionality in a wide variety of business
aspects implies a closeness to the customer, and logically, as argued above,
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that closeness is best handled by a relationship.
As seen above, the relationship, once correctly utilized, can truly be of
a value-adding nature for both the vendor and the customer. The vendor
can quickly and effortlessly deliver its solution, and the customer can feel at
ease with its re-engineering process. Also, the customer’s trust in the vendor
is based on honest grounds, i.e., it can be considered an absolute trust. In
the case of a dishonest vendor, the customer might still have trust, but the
trust itself can only be relative, i.e., had the customer been able to review
all information, they would not have trusted the vendor.
However, as pointed out by Palmer (1996), see section 4.5.1, it can not
always be assumed that relationship marketing is realistic. Two of his pro-
posed cases are regarded as applicable to the ERP market. Firstly, the
customer might simply not be interested in a deep and close relationship;
aspects such as the customer having restrictive corporate policies and being
scared away by an observed customer detention might create a hesitant cus-
tomer. Secondly, with customers growing more knowledgeable about ERP
systems, the hedging aspect of a relationship is unnecessary.
Furthermore, whether the high demand of resources and capabilities in
relationship marketing is justified, is another interesting aspect. Intuitively,
see Equation 1, when the actual value of the relationship is less than the
value of exchanges, no relationship marketing can be justified. The cus-
tomer adopting this quantitative approach might frown upon such a costly
relationship.
At this point in the discussion, the second question at issue can be answered:
What tools can be used to control opportunism in the sales process?
Two tools to control opportunism have been presented: the contract, and
the relationship. While the former deals with hard facts, the latter man-
ages soft aspects. The empirical findings show that the contract was not
seen as a strategic instrument of reducing opportunism. Two aspects of
strategic employment of the contract can be seen: a market-strategic aspect
where the progressive contract writing is seen as a source for competitive
advantage; and a customer-strategic aspect where the contract should reflect
a direct responsibility on the vendor’s behalf. The empirical findings also
show that vendors consider their formed relationship to be something they
are not. The alleged relationships when compared to relationship marketing
theory turn out to be on a lower level than anticipated. Finally, two imbal-
ances appear. Firstly, the hegemony of behaviour-based contracts show of
a risk imbalance. Secondly, the slant towards the relationship to lessen op-
portunism shows an imbalance in deployment between the contract and the
relationship to address opportunism. Should these imbalances be attended
to, this would undoubtedly benefit both parties.
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6.3 Improvement of control
Given a situation containing opportunism and with a set of controlling tools,
the notion of observability arises. Obviously, there is a need to be able to
see when and how to apply these controlling tools. In the proposed analyti-
cal framework, this observability is somewhat described by the information
aspect, see section 5.1.3. The observability inherits two characteristics from
the information aspect—the difficulty of isolating the correct information
and how to price this information.
6.3.1 Observability
Observable opportunism can be defined as both parties being aware of poten-
tial opportunism. If this situation applies, both parties will want to reduce
the potential opportunism; the buyer because opportunism has a negative
effect on business; the vendor because a safe customer is better than an
unsafe customer (Gao et al., 2005).
Consider the case of imperfect information. Then, in order to observe op-
portunism, the vendor must spend resources to disclose opportunism. Log-
ically, if no resources are spent, the possibility of disclosing opportunism is
slim. On the other side of the vendor-customer relationship, the customer
might for any reason be able to observe the opportunism. This entails a
situation where the vendor does not eliminate the opportunism seen by the
customer, simply because it goes unobserved. Consequently, the vendor’s
inability to respond to the situation will most probably deteriorate the good-
will of the relationship—its chances for adding value to both parties would
hence be severely lessened. Ultimately, the vendor must act pro-actively to
see and anticipate possibilities of perceived opportunism on the principal’s
behalf.
6.3.2 Feedback loop
Naturally, the problem of deteriorating goodwill could be partially solved by
spending more resources on disclosing opportunism. Measurements must be
taken and evaluated, and countermeasures must be launched. Keeping the
analytical framework in mind, this procedure will be displayed as a feedback
loop from the output, opportunism, to the controlling tools, the contract and
the relation, as illustrated in Figure 5. In the ideal case of full observability,
perfect information is implied; hence, the sources of opportunism, the agency
problem and risk-sharing problem, disappear.
Nevertheless, the empirical findings reveal that this concept is not di-
rectly used by any of the interviewed vendors; if so, it is formalized only
in financial terms, thus not completely covering the wide scope of oppor-
tunism. Another issue to consider is the cost of measurement; if these are
higher than the value being destroyed for the vendor, he/she will not see
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this as beneficial.
Figure 5: The analytical framework with the proposed feedback loop
At this point in the discussion, the third question at issue can be answered:
How can these tools be properly managed to reduce opportunism in the sales
process?
With the customer aware of potential opportunism, the vendor must mea-
sure and evaluate possible sources of opportunism to avoid deteriorating
goodwill. More so, in order to be as thorough as possible, the measurement
and evaluation must cover and serve both parties’ contractual and relational
aspects. This is done by none of the interviewed vendors, possibly because
the measurement cost is deemed too high. With an incomplete perception of
the context, the effect of the controlling tools will be limited—they will not
be directly affected by the context. Mathematically speaking, decreasing
the domain of the controlling tools will also generally decrease their range,
implying a sub-optimal reduction of opportunism.
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7 Reflections
7.1 Implications for future research
This paper studies the relationship between two parties. Since the empirical
data solely is based on the vendor, to get a fuller view of the relationship, a
natural continuance would be to study the customer. An interesting aspect
would be to study the customer’s view on opportunism, as the perception
rather than the actual existence of opportunism is an recurring theme of the
paper. However, as pointed out in section 4.2, the emphasis on opportunism
might not be solidly founded.
As seen in the discussion regarding the third question at issue, a re-
current aspect is the collection of information as means to reduce oppor-
tunism. The basis of the agency theory assumes this information can be
purchased. As proposed in section 5.1.3, there are two issues to be con-
sidered when acquiring this commodity: the location and identification of
the needed information, and its pricing. However, an important issue is not
considered—in order to make a complete financial analysis, the alternative
cost must be considered. Chances are that the cost of opportunism do not
exceed the cost of collection the information, and therefore the investment
is not worthwhile. This is an interesting field for future studies. Also, to be
able to estimate the cost of opportunism, arguably, even more information
needs to be collected. Thus, the financial analysis itself will also be resource
demanding, not only must the alternative costs be considered, but also the
cost of the analysis itself.
As mentioned in section 6.2.1, there are implications of an evolution
towards a standard practice in quantifying the outcome of ERP systems.
Further research on the evolution of these measurements would be of interest.
Related research would be an in-depth study of the present trends and signs
of this proposed evolution.
7.2 Methodological considerations
Upon hindsight, two methodological aspects can be addressed: replicability
and validity. First, this paper is deemed to be highly replicable. Although
the interviewees showed different ways of going about, they gave similar
accounts when describing the general nature of the sales process. Thus,
if repeated in a similar setup with different interviewees, the results will
probably be similar to the gathered results of this paper. Second, a fleeting
subjective observation was made—a slight difference in the business ap-
proach between large and small vendors. This could be seen as lessening the
validity, the chosen vendors could have been selected from a more narrow
perspective. However, as they gave similar accounts when describing the
general nature of the sales process, this lessening of validity is judged to be
small in magnitude.
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7.3 Theoretical considerations
In selling an ERP system, obviously, a task has been delegated from one
party to another. Hence, the agency theory was chosen as the theoretical
foundation. In this theory, the relationship is controlled by a contract, more
precisely described in the principal-agency theory. However, the contract
only deals with hard aspects of the interaction and not with softer ones.
To describe the softer side of the interaction requires another theoretical
aspect, namely, relationship marketing. The relationships observed in the
ERP market exhibit factors such as mutual trust and confidence. Hence,
using this theory is rather natural. When using the proposed analytical
framework, no theoretical conflicts have arisen—it has served its purpose
well. Altogether, since all the elements of the theoretical framework are well-
founded and regularly seen in scientific discourse, this adds further validity
to this paper.
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B Interview information
Vendor: Alpha
Representative: Senior Salesperson
Date: 22-04-2005
Place: The company office
Time: 120 minutes
Interviewers: Kullenberg, Lo¨fgren, Mannesson, Ma˙nsson
Vendor: Beta
Representative: Senior Salesperson
Date: 09-05-2005
Place: Coffeehouse by George, Lund
Time: 90 minutes
Interviewers: Kullenberg, Lo¨fgren, Ma˙nsson
Vendor: Gamma
Representative: Business product manager
Date: 02-05-2005
Place: The company office
Time: 120 minutes
Interviewers: Kullenberg, Lo¨fgren, Mannesson, Ma˙nsson
Vendor: Delta
Representative: Senior Salesperson
Date: 26-04-2005
Place: The company office
Time: 90 minutes
Interviewers: Kullenberg, Mannesson
Vendor: Epsilon
Representative: Senior Salesperson
Date: 13-05-2005
Place: The company office
Time: 90 minutes
Interviewers: Kullenberg, Mannesson, Ma˙nsson
System developer: Omega
Representative: Senior Salesperson
Date: 20-04-2005
Place: The company office
Time: 120 minutes
Interviewers: Kullenberg, Lo¨fgren, Mannesson, Ma˙nsson
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Agenda setting questions:
How would you describe the sales process?
How would you characterize the relationship with the buyer?
What services do you provide?
What is your view on the competition in the ERP industry?
Specific questions:
Is the sales process differentiated by customer?
Is the salesperson involved in the implementation process?
What are the areas of interaction between vendor and customer?
What does the contract contain?
Are there any incentives used in the sales process?
What is promised as a result of implementing an ERP system?
Does the observed results affect the current sales process?
Is the relationship being evaluated? If so, how?
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